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The principle of parsimony, also known as 
“Occam’s razor,” is a heuristic dictum that is 
thoroughly familiar to virtually all 
practitioners of science: Aristotle, Newton, 
and many others have enunciated it in some 
form or other. Even though the principle is 
not difficult to comprehend as a general 
heuristic guideline, it has proved surprisingly 
resistant to being put on a rigorous footing – 
a difficulty that has become more pressing 
and topical with the “big data” explosion. 
We review the significance of Occam’s razor 
in the philosophical and theological writings 
of William of Ockham, and survey modern 
developments of parsimony in data science. 
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Introduction 
Parsimony is a virtue, but not a guarantor of truth. Yet this is what popular renditions of Occam’s 
“razor” maxim would have us believe: the simplest explanation is said to be the best. An 
explanation is a theory or hypothesis consistent with the known facts, and we would be forgiven to 
infer that by the best is meant: correct, or else perhaps: the most likely. 
 A counterexample readily establishes that parsimony is not necessarily the path to truth, nor 
even the most likely approximant to truth. For suppose someone makes the following 
observations: 
?, ?, ?, 0, ?, ?, ?, 0, ?, ?, ?, … 
where the question mark indicates a missing data point. Then a simple pattern consistent with 
these data is as follows:  
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, … 
where the actual data have been underlined. This, most would agree, is the most parsimonious 
“explanation” even though we should perhaps not be all that confident given the paucity of the 
data set. Now let another observer gather the following data: 
?, ?, 16, ?, 36, ?, 64, ?, ?, ?, … 
and surmise that these observations reflect the following underlying pattern of squares: 
4, 9, 16, 25, 36, 49, 64, 81, … 
– again a parsimonious account of the data (arguably “the simplest”). It turns out that both 
observers have partially observed the very same phenomenon: 
4, 9, 16, 0, 36, 32, 64, 0, … 
and both have come up with incorrect inter- and extrapolations of the fragmentary data. The above 
is the start of a well-defined mathematical sequence with its own underlying regularity as well as a 
physical meaning, viz. the number of coincidence site lattices of index n in the Z4 lattice1. The first 
observer would expect the next term to be 0, whereas the second observer would guess 100 (the 
square of 10), but both would be wrong… the actual value being 168. 
What makes this example work is that (i) both observers have to work with pretty 
sparse data sets, and (ii) the complexity underpinning the sequence is far greater than the naïve 
observer might have thought (the reader will be spared the actual formula). But these 
circumstances are entirely typical of the scientific endeavour: even in the present age of “big data” 
the cumulative corpus of observational data collected by humans or instruments acting on their 
behalf is infinitesimal compared to the data that might have been gathered by some omnipotent 
being – indeed, it is a small miracle that science seems to be possible at all. As for underlying 
complexity, this is a more contentious point, since there is no generally agreed-upon (and 
universally applicable) concept of complexity, and even then: the best scientific theories we have 
at present are quite simple, but only when looked at in the right light. The lesson that the history of 
science teaches is that, as our insights (notably our mathematics) evolve, we continually change 
our opinions about what constitutes complexity, elegance and the like. 
In sum, even if the above example seems somewhat contrived, it is in fact perfectly 
representative of the existential dilemmas routinely faced by scientists. What might seem to be an 
elegant and appealing theory to one particular scientist, working with a partial view of the world, 
will not necessarily correspond to what will appear to be the simplest explanation to another 
scientist working with a different corpus on information (as well as with different cultural and 
personal prejudices, intellectual skills, et cetera). If we admit to this much by way of scientific 
relativism, are we then bound to conclude that “anything goes”2? It is here that parsimony 
becomes a virtue, as it reigns in the wildest flights of fancy and, we hope, enables us to extricate 
ourselves more easily from yesterday’s misconceptions. For one thing, theories that are 
parsimonious are more likely to satisfy the falsifiability criterion. 
 
 
Occam’s razor in Ockham’s time 
William of Ockham (c. 1285-1349) is of course is not to blame for our bungling equating of 
simplicity and truth. In fact, the principle of parsimony does not even originate with him. As is so 
often the case, we can find the beginnings with Aristotle, who wrote in his Posterior Analytics: 
“Let that demonstration be better which, other things being equal, depends on fewer postulates or 
suppositions or propositions.”3 Commenting on this passage, Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168-1253) 
expanded this to a more sweeping “that is better and more valuable which requires fewer, other 
circumstances being equal.”4 For Grosseteste, the logical conclusion of Aristotle’s maxim was that 
best of all is that which requires no assumptions whatsoever. Here we may reflect that for 
medieval philosophers, who were first and foremost men of faith, those truths that were 
immediately perceptible as such – that could be unequivocally apprehended by the human mind – 
took center stage in their metaphysics. By contrast, modern scientists and mathematicians have 
learned to be especially weary, at least outside the arena of theology, of “axiomatic truths” that 
would appear to be self-evident. For instance, Frege was quite convinced of the obvious 
consistency of his formalization of set theory, and yet Russell famously found a fatal flaw, which 
a hastily penned addendum could not repair7. Furthermore, whenever a proposition is undecidable 
within the framework of a formal system, that system can be extended by adding either the 
undecidable proposition or its negation as an axiom, in either case without loss of consistency, 
which makes clear that the technical meaning of “axiom” has strayed from its original meaning of 
“self-evident truth” (from ἄξιος meaning “worthy” as in: worthy of consideration). 
Grosseteste did not just produce a translation of the complete works of Aristotle 
(complete with extended commentary), but he also performed original research on light and 
colour, which can be appreciated as an early adumbration of the scientific method.4 From a 
modern perspective, we are struck particularly by Grosseteste’s promulgation of mathematics as a 
unifying framework for the description of nature. Indeed, it could be argued that the adoption of 
mathematics by natural philosophers is itself a far-reaching expression of the principle of 
economy.  
 For Ockham, however, parsimony was primarily a matter of ontological minimalism, which 
he may have derived from his near-contemporary Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308)5. Ockham viewed 
abstractions and generalizations as mental concepts derived from the perceiving of particulars, and 
discerning among these similarities, affinities, derivations and the like. Conception amounts to the 
act of understanding individual objects in certain ways, each such way corresponding to one 
particular concept. But abstractions (in the widest sense of the word) were not, for Ockham, to be 
regarded as entities in their own right. Such entities, called universals, left classical logic 
hamstrung – and universals were but one problem among many that made the ancient syllogistic 
logic unwieldy, cumbersome, and consequently far less powerful than the much more streamlined 
logical systems we use today6. Ockham also observed that NOT (A AND B) ≡ NOT A .OR NOT B and 
NOT (A OR B) ≡ NOT A .AND NOT B, which today we call the fundamental Boolean equivalences. 
 In a similar vein, Ockham rejected the distinction between essence and existence, thought by 
some to be required to distinguish the creator from his creatures5. For Ockham it sufficed to note 
that God’s essence and existence were co-extensive in virtue of the necessity of God, whereas any 
other creature’s existence is caused by divine will. Ockham also applied his razor to the 
“faculties” of the human mind5. For instance, willing (volition) as opposed to understanding or 
perceiving (intellect) were at the time regarded as being as distinct as, say, the sensory modalities 
of hearing or smelling (which we know to be based on distinct anatomical structures). Ockham 
viewed willing and understanding simply as two different acts of the rational soul, and similarly 
for other mental faculties5. Generalizing, we might say that his universe consisted of fewer things, 
each of which could do more, thus breaking with the traditions of medieval thought and giving a 
distinctly modern feel to his arguments. 
Ockham’s ontological minimalism constituted a new way (via moderna, as opposed to the 
old way, via antiqua) that came to be known as nominalism or termism5. Even if his philosophical 
system was not fully satisfactory, we can recognise with the benefit of hindsight that his thinking 
displayed considerable affinity with modern analytical philosophy. Although his efforts were 
almost exclusively bent toward religious matters, as we might expect of a 14th-century Franciscan, 
his striving to achieve the maximum possible with the smallest possible set of conceptual tools 
feels congenial to our own intellectual predilections. 
It seems hardly likely that Ockham deliberately set out to revolutionize (or even just 
streamline) Western thought. His primary motivation seems to have been religious, in particular to 
safeguard Christian doctrine from Greco-Islamic necessitarianism, which posits that divine will is 
itself still subject to moral and ethical norms5. On this principle, there are moral imperatives 
related to good versus evil, right versus wrong, that one has to accept as being in some sense 
greater than God insofar as they impose boundaries on his will. 
The proper Christian perspective, for Ockham, was that God is restricted only by logic: God 
cannot perform acts that are logically impossible, but this is truly the only constraint on his 
powers5. Although this move should technically count as a liberation of God, the mystics that 
reacted against Ockhamism appear to have felt that Ockham had made logic itself greater than 
God; these reactionaries disapproved of what they saw as Ockham’s arid and ultra-refined 
scholasticism5. 
Ockham’s insistence on the primacy of logic and ontological economy, in which we now 
perceive the seeds of later developments, did land him in hot water. Freed from necessitarianism, 
God could compel a person to do what would normally be regarded as evil, and the question 
whether that act would then constitute a sin was an issue that exercised his contemporaries5. 
For Ockham, God could also confound a person’s senses and cause false perceptions, since 
it followed from divine omnipotence that whatever God does by means of secondary causes he can 
do without them (in modern parlance we might say that God can bypass the laws of physics, the 
latter merely being his default way of making the world happen) 5. This was another vexed matter 
since truths immediately apprehended by the senses (and the intellect) were, for many, 
metaphysically essential and a prerequisite for faith. The idea that God could cause a false 
experience, be it a sensory hallucination or the bliss of revelation itself, was deemed highly 
upsetting if not blasphemous. 
To make matters worse, Ockham questioned the possibility that the immortality of the soul 
could be proven, or even that the existence of God could be demonstrated, if by God we 
understand an entity that is absolutely supreme AND perfect AND unique AND infinite5. On the other 
hand, if by God we merely mean an entity unsurpassed in perfection and nobility, existence is 
trivially provable but uniqueness is not; alternatively, if by God we mean the “first efficient cause” 
then he must exist by logical necessity – in this Ockham followed the consensus of his time5. 
Such doggedly logical points of view were not well received by the church hierarchy. We 
may well imagine a situation in which, on the one hand, we have the sincerely devout Ockham 
who in the light of his new way of thinking (via moderna), imagines that he has only underlined 
the primacy of faith, which for him has become the only way in which a mortal creature can 
apprehend that, in point of fact, there is a God who is absolutely supreme AND perfect AND unique 
AND infinite (and who does not confound our senses because, as it happens, he is benevolent), and 
on the other hand, we have Ockham’s superiors who as a matter of practical intelligence perceive 
all too well how Ockham’s teachings were bound to go down with the masses. It will, then, not 
come as a huge surprise that Ockham never received the licence to teach; he was to remain a lowly 
“inceptor” and effectively denied full professorship because he was too far ahead of his time5. 
 Ockham’s razor primarily served to sever faith from rational enquiry. This instigated the 
separation of theology from philosophy (and hence what we call natural science), a split that soon 
became more prominent and gained support from thinkers belonging to various religious orders 
(often mendicants) 5. From our modern point of view, we could readily view this is as a first step 
towards, and perhaps even a precondition for, the later developments of the renaissance and the 
Enlightenment. 
 
 
Modern elaborations of Occam’s razor 
We saw in the foregoing section that Occam’s razor could with equal justice be called Aristotle’s 
maxim or perhaps Grosseteste’s parsimony. If it has become associated with Ockham’s name, this 
is because of the wide-ranging impact that his ontological minimalism had on 14th-century 
thought. Many of Ockham’s preoccupations are looked upon quite differently today. For instance, 
Islamic necessitarianism is hardly viewed now as the most pressing threat to the propriety of 
Christendom, modern neural science is comfortable with the idea of mental faculties as different 
activities performed by the brain (although the issue of anatomical or histological correlates 
remains topical), and the paradoxes of omnipotence no longer appear to incite ecclesiastical 
schisms. 
 Thus, for us, Occam’s razor boils down to merely the general guiding principle that had 
already been enunciated by Aristotle, and whose prominence in modern scientific thinking was 
perhaps sealed by Newton’s admonishment that “we are to admit no more causes of natural things 
than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances […] Nature is pleased with 
simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes […] hypotheses non fingo.”8 Ockham 
was no pantheist 5, but if we allow ourselves some sort of identification of the divine with nature or 
the laws of nature, which are here being personified by Newton (if only for rhetorical reasons), we 
may begin to perceive a continuity of thought. A pantheistic rendition of Occam’s razor might 
read: “do not presume too much on the mind of God.” 
Although the idea is clear enough, a worry remains: we are not to multiply 
hypotheses unnecessarily, but how does one actually count hypotheses? As every working 
researcher knows, hypotheses come in complex networks of similar ideas with all manner of 
variations and interdependencies. Counting them is by no means straightforward: it is rather like 
counting clouds. Moreover, if we are faced with the choice between two plausible hypotheses of 
modest scope and a single outrageous one, which option is the more economical one? Is there a 
way to put the principle of parsimony on a more rigorous footing? We shall briefly discuss three 
promising avenues. 
 
The Large Deviation principle 
When we consider the “typical case” say corresponding to the average (or perhaps the mode) of 
the statistical distribution of some quantity of interest, and we scrutinize the relationship between 
the concentration of probability mass and the underlying combinatorics, we often find that this 
concentration is due to the fact that values near to the mean (or the mode) can be brought about in 
many different ways, e.g. in terms of configurations of the underlying system. The numerical 
imbalance between the “typical case” and any other cases (which are variously called “deviations” 
or “fluctuations” or simply “the tail”) can become truly overwhelming in statistical physics and 
gives rise to the remarkable robustness of thermodynamical principles9. 
 Once a deviation (that is to say an a priori very unlikely event) is observed, the situation is 
radically altered: although, as with the mean, the deviation could have come about in many 
different ways, there tends to be one particular way that is overwhelmingly more likely (given that 
the deviation has occurred) then any of the other ones10. The other ways dwarf this one special 
case in their number, but are in turn suppressed by their being exponentially less likely, which 
renders them irrelevant even in the aggregate10. In other words: if an exceedingly unlikely 
fluctuation does happen, we can be exceedingly sure of the way in which it happens. The word 
“exceedingly” in the previous sentence gains in force as we move out into “the tail” – around the 
mean, where fluctuations are rare but as yet not all that unlikely to happen, the singling-out effect 
is weak. (The mathematically inclined reader will have intuited that these broad, sweeping 
statements are the verbal upshot of a series of precise technical statements taking the form of limit 
theorems10.) 
 The universality of this principle, which has numerous applications in such disparate fields 
as statistical physics9, critical transitions11, and mathematical immunology12, has led to its being 
given a special name: The Large Deviation Principle (LDP)10. It is perhaps not as famous as the 
Central Limit Theorem, but it deserves to be. 
 How is the LDP relevant to Occam’s razor? Well, that one particular way in which the 
unlikely event is virtually bound to have happened given that, against the odds, it did – that one 
particular way also corresponds to the least complicated way in which it could have happened. 
This is admittedly an imprecise and contentious statement: first, it begs the question of defining 
complexity, which has not yet been accomplished, and second, if a suitable definition of 
complexity were at hand, we might find that the state of affairs pointed to by the LDP is not 
always the “simplest”. All the same, the LDP configuration does tend to correspond to what one 
would intuitively call the simplest way. 
 We could turn this on its head and define simplicity as whatever the LDP identifies as the 
most likely. This is by no means as outrageous as it might seem. For one thing, we would end up 
with a concept of simplicity that ties in well with our intuition, and for another thing, this new 
concept would be as unambiguous and rigorous as the LDP principle itself. We would be able to 
forge a strong link between overwhelming likelihood and simplicity, i.e. parsimony. 
 It is tempting to put the LDP forward, however tentatively, as a modern version of the 
principle of parsimony. However, there is one obvious fly in the ointment: the LDP is about large 
deviations, that is to say, large fluctuations away from the norm. How can this be relevant to the 
discovery of natural law, which after all is primarily concerned with characterizing “the norm”? 
There is no satisfactory answer to this question, but let us venture a provocative answer: our entire 
universe is a priori tremendously unlikely – according to Roger Penrose, for every way the 
universe could have existed at the instant of the Big Bang, there are exp{exp{284}} other ways 
for the universe (at any instant) to be13, and this vast number is probably a gross underestimate in 
the context of the present discussion. Consequently, the way the world is put together is as the 
LDP tells us it should be. We find ourselves straying back into theological territory, cosmogony in 
particular, as we appear to be presupposing a statistical distribution over an ensemble of universes. 
The idea of a multiverse seems to throw all ontological economy to the wind, and one may well 
question its cogency. 
 
Kolmogorov complexity 
As traditionally formulated, the principle of parsimony seems to require that we rank and compare 
rival theories by simply counting their hypotheses, suppositions, assumptions, and the like. If 
counting, as such, does not appear to be well-defined, it makes sense to cast about for a more 
suitable numerical measure by means of which we might quantify how “involved” a theory is. 
 One promising candidate is Kolmogorov complexity14. Given any data object, we may 
consider the computer programs that produce that object as output. The length of the shortest 
program among these is the Kolmogorov complexity of that object. The basic idea is that the effort 
it takes to specify a thing tells us how complex that thing really is. Kurt Gödel was already 
thinking among similar lines in 1936 when he considered the length of proofs as a measure of 
complexity15. The Kolmogorov complexity is not to be confused with the size in raw bits of the 
data object: if the latter is large, but very regular in its structure, the shortest program needed to 
produce it can be much shorter. One may think that the choice of programming language matters, 
but this turns out to be unimportant: if two programming languages are equally powerful, one can 
always add a conversion module (of bounded length) to the code, and the extra burden drops out 
as soon as we start doing comparisons between data objects14. 
 Now if the Kolmogorov complexity of a binary data object x is K(x), the algorithmic 
probability of x is defined as 2–K(x) (here K(x) is the variant of Kolmogorov complexity known 
more specifically as algorithmic prefix complexity14). This probability is of the same order (“big-
O,” for the mathematically inclined reader) as the universal a priori probability of the data 
object14. More complex thus becomes tantamount to less likely, again providing the “Occam 
connection” we have been looking for. 
Whereas the universal a priori probability accumulates the probabilities over all programs 
that produce x, the algorithmic probability is based on the shortest one. The probabilities 
nonetheless turn out to be pretty much the same. This can only happen because the universal a 
priori probability is dominated by the contribution from the shortest (“simplest”) one14, an effect 
strongly reminiscent of the LDP. 
If theories can be encoded as data objects, their Kolmogorov complexity gives us a means to 
compare their parsimoniousness. Again one might quibble about the encoding language that is 
used, but once more the language chosen only adds a constant to the complexity that cancels when 
comparisons are being made. So that answers our initial question on how to define complexity. 
However, things can be taken further. Consider the data that are available regarding one 
particular phenomenon: we can regard this as a corpus-to-date, a data object that grows in size 
every time observations are made, experiments and measurements being done, and so on. The 
Kolmogorov complexity of this corpus will change as well every time information is being added 
to it. In fact, inasmuch as a “lawlike” theory of the phenomenon is possible at all, we should 
expect that the Kolmogorov complexity tops out and levels off. The reason for this is that the 
shortest possible program reproducing the corpus is equivalent to a formal theory accounting for 
the phenomenon at hand. Thus, as soon as sufficient data have been added to the corpus to 
determine such a theory (bearing in mind our introductory example, we reflect that this may 
require a substantial mass of data), the shortest program will “stabilise” and the corresponding 
Kolmogorov complexity should no longer increase. This stabilized shortest program is known as 
the Occam for the data corpus14. 
In much the same way that Turing machines render the concept of effective computation 
unambiguous, but are poor blueprints for actual calculation devices, the Kolmogorov complexity 
of a growing data set is an excellent conceptual device to elucidate the principle of parsimony in 
the process of theory discovery, but not necessarily a suitable recipe for actual “automated” 
science. In fact, we should not expect computers to take over the scientific discovery process any 
time soon. Humans (as opposed to an imaginary “Kolmogorov computer”) have been able to 
construct superb theories on the basis of comparatively scant data13, possibly because they bring 
the imagination and intuition to the game that allows them to make the correct conceptual leaps, 
and think of the experiment that will decide the crucial question. This psychological aspect of 
creative genius is obviously missing from the Kolmogorov account, in fact deliberately so, since 
the objective was just to isolate the algorithmic-informational side of the problem. 
Incidentally, the foregoing argument does not rule out the possibility of building machines 
capable of scientific discovery (or any other aspect of human thought). Indeed, insofar as the mind 
is the expression of a physical process, we ought to expect that this process could equally well be 
set up in an artificial contrivance (whether or not we would still be comfortable calling such a 
device a “computer”). One may go one step further and, citing the celebrated Church-Turing 
thesis, maintain that mental processes are emulatable/simulatable by a classic computing device16. 
Returning to the concept of the “Occam program,” we may consider two roughly equivalent 
ways of looking at the asymptotic behaviour of the Kolmogorov complexity as the data corpus 
grows, which are interesting since they come each with their own flavour and connotations. One is 
that of extrapolation, the other that of data compression. As regards extrapolation, let us consider 
again the corpus as it grows whenever observational data are added. At each stage we have the 
best candidate-Occam thus far, i.e. the shortest program associated with the Kolmogorov 
complexity of the data corpus. Letting this candidate produce the outcome of the next experiment 
(i.e. extrapolation or prediction), and then actually performing the experiment, we find ourselves 
able to compare prediction and outcome and hence obtain an idea of how close we are to the 
“leveling off” point. The world being noisy, things are complicated to no small extent by the fact 
that we have to allow for some margin of error14. 
As regards data compression, we observe that the data object encoding the shortest program 
(along with some suitable inputs etc.) contains all that is worth knowing of the original object. 
This allows for substantial savings when the corpus data are to be transmitted over some channel 
of communication. We transmit the (much shorter) program object instead of the full data object, 
and the receiver “unzips” it. The saturation point of the data corpus is achieved when the 
compressed counterpart of the growing data object stops increasing in size. Incidentally, data 
objects that resist compression – whose Kolmogorov complexity continues to increase in 
proportion to their raw size – can for that very reason be defined as “devoid of pattern,” and a 
rigorous notion of randomness can be developed, taking this as a starting point14. 
Perhaps the receiver actually finds the short object more useful anyway, in much the same 
way that we prefer the formulas F = m.a or E = m.c2 to the respective (and sizable) corpora of data 
that warrant these laws. We may even come to think of such “laws” as extremely succinct 
summaries of experimental data sets: a valid point of view, if not to everyone’s taste. 
 
Bayesian inference 
LDP and Kolmogorov complexity both lend support to the idea that “simplest is likeliest” and lead 
us to suspect that likelihood should take logical precedence, with simplicity being secondarily 
defined in terms of wherever likelihood takes us. An approach that is entirely grounded in the idea 
of likelihood departs from a fundamental equality in mathematical statistics17: 
P[A|B]×P[B] = P[A AND B] = P[B|A]×P[A] 
where A and B stand for any two events and P[…] means probability of … and P[A|B] denotes the 
probability of A, given that B occurs. This can be rearranged as P[A|B] = P[B|A]×P[A]/P[B] 
which is a simple form of “Bayes’ Law” 17. 
 To apply this to the problem at hand, we replace A by some hypothesis Hi and B by the 
corpus-to-date of data D, and we have an expression for the likelihood of the hypothesis given the 
data: 
P[Hi|D] = P[D|Hi]×P[Hi]/P[D] 
where we may compute P[D] as ∑iP[D|Hi]×P[Hi] using the principle of total probability17. The 
idea is now that we have data D in hand and keep this as a constant; we seek to maximize P[Hi|D] 
over all hypotheses H1, H2, …, Hi,… and the argmax of this procedure is the hypothesis to be 
preferred. 
Conceptually, the term P[D|Hi] is not problematic. Even though it might well be the case that 
capturing Hi in the form of a suitable mathematical model requires substantial skill and intellectual 
resources, or that the actual calculation of P[D|Hi] imposes a huge strain on the available 
computational resources, the matter is nonetheless pretty straightforward from a 
philosophical/metaphysical perspective. 
Things stand dramatically different with the term P[Hi]: how can we interpret the probability 
of a hypothesis an sich in a meaningful way? Bayesians like to point out that P[Hi] is simply 
where we left things the last time we updated P[Hi|D] when the corpus D has data added to its 
mass, and it is in this idea of incremental updating and improvement that the present argument 
connects to the phenomenon of Kolmogorov complexity levelling off as data keep being added. 
Another reasonable point made by the Bayesians is that as D grows, P[Hi|D] settles on a value that 
is independent of the starting point. Still, there remains that niggling problem of choosing an 
appropriate starting distribution in the first place… 
As far as ontological economy goes, the notion of a prior statistical distribution over a space 
of hypotheses looks utterly wasteful indeed. It rather makes our earlier speculations about 
multiverses look like child’s play. Bayes himself seems to have preferred the notion of assuming a 
uniform distribution14. Philosophical misgivings18 aside, the pragmatic advantage becomes 
immediately obvious when we take logarithms: 
ln P[Hi|D] = ln P[D|Hi] + ln P[Hi] – ln ∑iP[D|Hi]×P[Hi] 
where the latter two terms cancel whenever we consider the differences between any two 
candidate hypotheses. Also, if we restrict ourselves to a space of hypotheses that are structurally 
the same and only differ with respect to the values of their parameters, we find that maximizing 
just the term ln P[D|Hi] becomes substantially more tractable. Moreover, if the prior probability of 
the data D (as obtained) is low, we should expect the quantity ln P[Hi|D] to be governed by the 
LDP, which is perhaps another indication that we should focus our attention on this term. 
 If we reject the idea of a universal uniform prior, we may look to Kolmogorov complexity to 
derive a priori probabilities. We saw that in the context of this theory, both Hi and D are treated as 
instances of data objects where we implicitly think of them as essentially defined by the programs 
that produce them as output. In turn, these programs are themselves nothing more than data 
objects that, as such, can be systematically enumerated. This systematic enumeration creates an a 
priori objective universe of “machines” that allows us to work out at which frequencies finite data 
strings are produced as initial segments of the output of the machines, when fed certain suitable 
inputs. These various claims are all rather loosely put here, as the non-trivial technical details 
would take us too far afield14. The upshot is that it is possible to define a “universal” statistical 
distribution over the space of hypotheses per se. This distribution is instrumental in the evaluation 
of the predictions produced by a candidate-Occam program, as discussed above14. In fact, since the 
enumeration has to weighed in one way or another, the construction can be said to let the 
assumption of a uniform prior distribution back in through the backdoor, and as such it remains 
susceptible to the same philosophical objections, 18 mitigated by the fact that the uniformity 
assumption is now being made at an extremely deep level, which ought to bestow some measure 
of objectivity. 
 
 
Prospects 
Nominalism is nowadays considered to be untenable, at least in any of its canonical 
formulations19. Nevertheless, the move from medieval Scholasticism to modern empiricism 
constituted a turning away from intimate communion with the true inner nature of things, and 
towards the primacy of observations and confining theories to “mere” description. The saving 
grace of the latter is the astounding succinctness that can be achieved. The formal apparatus of 
modern physics achieves an awful lot with, well, next to nothing, daunting as that nothing may 
seem to the uninitiated13. This sea change in Western thought can, with hindsight, be seen to hinge 
on Ockham’s penchant for ontological minimalism (along with similar arguments found with 
Robert Grossteste, Roger Bacon, and others5). 
 Modern data scientists are searching for a more thoroughgoing formalization and 
instrumentation of Occam’s razor. As we have seen, promising developments are found in the 
LDP, Kolmogorov complexity, and Bayesian inference. The numerous points of commonality that 
we have encountered among these approaches seem to indicate that we are only catching glimpses 
of a more mature theory in which all these ideas find a satisfactory and elegant unification. 
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